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Abstract
This study investigated how individuals, and narcissists in particular, respond when they
bring harm to someone they envy, and what they do in response to the harm that they
caused. We examined how high versus low levels of responsibility for harming an
envied person would affect levels of schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure at other’s suffering),
guilt and prosocial behavior. We expected that narcissists would display more
schadenfreude, less guilt, and less prosocial behavior than nonnarcissists, even when they
were made to feel responsible for the downfall of the person. Results showed a
significant relationship between narcissism and schadenfreude, with narcissists
experiencing more schadenfreude than less narcissistic individuals. No relationship was
found between narcissism and guilt or prosocial behavior. Responsibility did not affect
schadenfreude, guilt, or prosocial behavior.
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Introduction
Over the years, John Knowles’ renowned novel, A Separate Peace, has been a
staple in many American high school classrooms. This book tells the story of Gene, an
intellectually gifted student who becomes best friends with Phineas (aka Finny)—a
popular, athletically gifted student. Gene grows jealous of Finny’s natural abilities and
charm and soon begins to resent and despise him. While standing on a tree limb with
Finny, Gene shakes the branches, causing Finny to fall and permanently injure his leg.
Although the incident is viewed by all (but Gene) to be an accident, Gene begins to feel
deep guilt over his actions. He visits Finny, trying to take full blame for the accident, but
is kept from doing so by the doctor, who interrupts Gene and sends Finny home. Gene
continues to visit Finny, eventually training for the Olympics in Finny’s place—
attempting to “become a part of Phineas.”
This story illustrates the central investigation of the present study—to examine
how people respond when they cause harm to those they envy, and what they do in
response to the harm they have caused. Past research has demonstrated people’s
enjoyment of seeing envied others brought down or lowered in status—a phenomenon
referred to as ‘schadenfreude’ (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Leach, Spears, Branscombe, &
Doosje, 2003; Smith, Turner, & Garonzik, 1996). This reduction of the envied other’s
status, however, was often seen in one’s mind, as opposed to in reality. In other words,
people may derogate envied individuals or rationalize away their superiority rather than
cause their actual status to change. The present study, by contrast, looked at how people
respond once they have, in actuality, caused the other person harm.
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A sequence of events leads to the individual’s response to having caused harm to
the envied other. The catalyst of this sequence is the individual encountering an upward
comparison—such as Gene meeting Finny. This leads to an emotional threat —seen in
Gene’s envy of Finny’s natural abilities and charisma—to which the individual must
respond. At this point, individuals could take a number of different actions in response.
For example, they could diminish the superiority of the other in their mind or choose to
actually cause harm to the other person. In Gene’s case, he caused real physical harm.
There are two main emotional responses that individuals may experience as a result of
having succeeded in their goal of harming the envied individual. The person may feel
pleased about no longer having the previously envied other as an ego threat. However,
he or she may also feel guilt over having caused the person harm. (Clearly, this was the
response of Gene.) Finally, individuals may respond to this new emotion that they are
experiencing. In Gene’s case, he responded to his guilt with prosocial behavior—visiting
Finny and trying to fulfill Finny’s dreams for him.
Derogation of Upward Comparison Targets
Numerous studies have examined how individuals respond to superior others.
When confronted by an ego-threatening upward comparison, individuals can neutralize
the threat by making it less relevant to themselves, by decreasing the closeness of the
other, or by bringing the superior other down (Tesser & Collins, 1988). Making the
threat less relevant is often done in one’s own mind while decreasing closeness or
bringing the other person down can be done either through mental rationalization or
behavior.
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Rationalizing the threat may involve making the focus of the threat less relevant
to the individual’s own self-concept. This was demonstrated by Mussweiler, Gabriel, and
Bodenhausen (2000) who found that when outperformed by another, individuals
emphasized those aspects that made them different from the superior other. Specifically,
Caucasian women, when outperformed by an Asian woman, focused more on their
differing ethnic identities than their shared gender.
The individual may also decrease the ego threat by decreasing the closeness
between him or herself and the superior other. The most obvious form of this is putting
physical distance between the two. However, this is also accomplished through
increasing the superiority of the other, a phenomenon known as the genius effect. The
genius effect (Alicke, 1997) maintains that by making the superior other exceptionally
amazing, the individual raises him or her to a level of expertise or proficiency to the point
where he or she is no longer comparable. For example, Alicke found that people
exaggerated the abilities of others who beat them and Shepperd and Taylor (1999)
demonstrated that individuals occasionally ascribe advantages to a target of upward
comparison in order to make the two more dissimilar. In this way, if the superior person
outperforms the individual, it is possible to ascribe their worse performance to a
difference in advantages, rather than to a lack of ability. This is seen, for example, when
a tennis player infers that his or her loss is due to the opponent’s better coach, more
practice time or better racket, rather than a real difference in ability.
Finally, when faced with a superior other, an individual has the option of actually
decreasing the prestige of the person, or bringing that person down. This has often been
demonstrated as happening in the person’s mind (Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Wills, 1981).
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For example, Gibbons and McCoy found that individuals derogated upward comparison
targets by rating them as less likable. Derogation of the envied other is seen, for
example, when the tennis player who has lost his or her match says that the other player
may be talented in tennis, but is overweight and unsociable.
While past research has often focused on the mental denigration of superior
others, it is also possible for the person to be brought down in reality. Some people may
choose this method more often than others. One group that has been shown to have a
greater predisposition to bringing others down is narcissists. Marked by their inflated
self-views, high aggression towards threatening others, and low sense of guilt and
empathy (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavolic, 2004; Twenge & Campbell, 2003), narcissists
make ideal targets for an investigation of the derogation of upward comparative targets.
Many studies have demonstrated a tendency for narcissists to react negatively in
threatening upward comparative situations. For example, Morf and Rhodewalt (1993)
provided evidence that when informed that they had been outperformed on an egothreatening task, narcissists rated the threatening individual negatively.
Responses to Having Derogated an Upward Comparison Target
Once people have succeeded in bringing harm to an envied other, they may feel
satisfied. They had experienced a negative emotion (that of envy or ego threat) and they
have successfully eliminated it. Indeed, people often experience schadenfreude: pleasure
at the suffering of impressive others. For example, schadenfreude might be experienced
in response to the top student in one’s class failing a quiz or Martha Stewart being
imprisoned.
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Smith, Turner, and Garonzik (1996) explored the relationship between envy and
schadenfreude. They studied how participants responded when a superior student—the
object of envy—suffered a setback. They found that the more envy the participant had,
the more schadenfreude he or she experienced. Simply disliking the student was also
found to predict schadenfreude. Leach, Spears, Branscombe, and Doosje (2003) found
that Dutch participants reported experiencing schadenfreude upon hearing about a
German loss in soccer. The more interest the participant had in soccer and the more
threatened he or she felt by Dutch inferiority, the more schadenfreude he or she
experienced. They measured schadenfreude by having participants rate themselves on
emotional terms, such as happiness and satisfaction. Smith, Parrott, and Diener (1999)
also found that dispositional envy predicted the amount of schadenfreude participants felt
after negative feedback from an advantaged other.
An alternative possible response to having caused the person harm would be guilt
(instead of satisfaction). Instead of feeling happy about his or her success in eliminating
the ego threat, the person has now replaced envy with guilt. It is possible that the
offender who feels guilt will engage in prosocial behavior in order to relieve it (e.g.,
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Stillwell, 1994; Lindsey, 2005).
Some people are less likely to experience guilt than others. Those people who are
most likely to experience guilt are those who also experience empathy (Ferguson, Stegge,
Miller, & Olsen, 1999). Narcissists are recognized for both their lack of guilt and
empathy (Watson, Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984). Watson and Morris (1991) also
found that empathy negatively correlated with the exploitativeness and entitlement
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dimensions of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Hall & Raskin, 1979) 1 .
Similarly, Montebarroci, Surcinelli, Baldaro, Trombini, and Rossi (2004) found a
negative correlation between and narcissism and guilt.
Present Study
In past studies, one of the key elements in the examination of schadenfreude is
that the person has had no role in the downfall of the envied other (Leach et al., 2003).
However, a response of happiness versus guilt would likely vary depending on whether
the person had played a large or small role in causing the misfortune—an aspect that has
never before been investigated. The present study examined how the influence of playing
a large or small role in bringing down a superior other affected participants’ ability to
experience schadenfreude versus guilt. We expected that playing a significant role in the
misfortune of the other would lead to less schadenfreude and more guilt, primarily for
those who are low in narcissism. Narcissists, we predicted, would feel a higher level of
schadenfreude and less guilt than would nonnarcissists, despite their role in the downfall.
One of the key goals of this study was to examine the relationship of narcissism to
schadenfreude. No previous research has examined the relationship between these
factors. Past research has shown that narcissists experience less empathy and aggress
more towards superior others than do less narcissistic individuals. Therefore, we
predicted that narcissists would experience more schadenfreude and less guilt after
bringing harm to the applicant than non-narcissists. We also expected narcissists to have

1

The NPI is a 40-item measurement that can be subdivided into seven subscales;
Authority, Exhibitionism, Superiority, Vanity, Exploitativeness, Entitlement, and SelfSufficiency (Raskin & Terry, 1988).
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lower levels of prosocial behavior in response to having caused harm than nonnarcissists, due to their lower guilt.
The study presented participants with an exceptional job applicant and gave them
an opportunity to evaluate the applicant. Depending on experiment condition, the
participants were told that their decisions would be very influential or not on this
applicant’s chances of being hired. The participants were then informed that their rating
of the applicant was negative in comparison with other evaluations, and would likely hurt
the applicant’s ability to get the job. We examined their levels of schadenfreude and guilt
after they had learned of their harmful effect on the applicant. Finally, we gave them the
opportunity to rate the applicant again and tested subsequent prosocial behavior indicated
by way of an enhanced evaluation of the applicant.
Method
Participants
The participants consisted of 66 female undergraduate students enrolled in an
introductory psychology course. The upward comparison target in our study was female,
and we chose to run only female participants because male participants could not easily
be recruited and we wanted to use a same-sex comparison target. The total number of
participants does not include fourteen participants who were eliminated from analyses.
Four of these 14 participants were eliminated either because of computer malfunctions or
because they reported to the experimenter that they had misunderstood instructions. Five
participants were eliminated because they correctly guessed the hypothesis of the study.
Five participants were eliminated for scoring the applicant so highly that their evaluation
could not conceivably have negatively affected the applicant. (On a scale of 0-100, all

8

scores at 90 and above were eliminated.) Students received class credit for their
participation in the study.
Materials and Procedure
First Questionnaire. Participants first filled out a questionnaire, which examined
the participant’s levels of narcissism and self-esteem using the NPI (M= 15.65, SD= 7.53;
Cronbach’s alpha= .87) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (M= 52.35, SD= 9.65;
Cronbach’s alpha= .85; RSE; Rosenberg, 1965).
Cover Story. Once participants had completed the first questionnaire, the cover
story was explained. They were informed that each psychology lab at their university
had one student lab manager—a competitive and prestigious position—and a number of
lab assistants. These positions, the experimenter explained, are open to psychology
majors who apply for them. In the previous year, this particular lab had ostensibly run a
study during the time that they were hiring students. The study had looked at the
influence of different factors on evaluations of applicants. Because the study was a
success, a new study was being conducted again this year. Participants were told that this
year's study was designed to test how people form first impressions based on descriptive
information. The second purpose of the study was ostensibly to make better hiring
decisions by using the educated evaluations of students. The experimenter explained that
the participants were going to evaluate one of the applicants for the job and that their
evaluations would later be taken into consideration during the hiring process because the
participants had not met the applicant and were, therefore, theoretically less biased.
Experiment Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to either the high
responsibility or low responsibility conditions. In the high responsibility condition,
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participants learned that they were one of only two participants whose evaluations would
be considered in hiring the applicant. In the low responsibility condition, participants
were told that they were just one of thirty participants whose evaluations would be
considered. This allowed us to manipulate the level of responsibility participants felt
they had over the applicant’s likelihood of being hired. In other words, the participant
was told that she was going to have either a very influential effect or a less important
effect on the applicant.
Lab Manager Evaluation. Once the premise of the study had been explained, the
participant was given an application and recommendation letter of an applicant to review
(See Appendixes A and B for full set of materials). The application had been filled out
before the experiment began, allegedly by the applicant. The application consisted of 19
responses to questions that inquired about such things as the student’s academic
performance, athletic ability, and leadership skills. The answers to the application
questions revealed that the applicant excelled in all three of these domains. A photocopy
of a fake student identification card was also attached to the application in order to
present the applicant as an attractive female. The applicant was made attractive and
athletic in order to prevent the participants from decreasing the threat of the applicant by
concluding that she was a stereotypical “nerd.” The recommendation letter, supposedly
written by a psychology professor, was positive except for one brief criticism of the
applicant’s sensitivity in leading people. The participant was also given an audio
recording of an interview with the applicant, which was a one-minute audio clip from an
interview with the applicant that presented the applicant as self-assured and successful,
although a bit arrogant. We included an audio clip as part of the evaluation in order to
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give participants an ambiguous source of information about the applicant that they could
interpret in different ways. This, along with making the applicant slightly arrogant and
including a critique in the recommendation letter, was done in order to avoid ceiling
effects in the evaluations of the applicant. It was expected that less narcissistic
individuals would rate the applicant more positively, despite the arrogance, while
narcissists would use the applicants' arrogance as an excuse to negatively rate her.
After taking a few moments to review the application, read the recommendation
letter, and listen to the interview clip, the participant completed an evaluation of the
applicant (See Appendix C). This evaluation allowed the participant to rate the applicant
on 13 different positive characteristics such as kindness, patience, and dependability. At
the end of the evaluation, participants were asked two questions regarding whether the
professor should hire the applicant and whether the participant would hire the applicant.
These two questions were answered on a 100-point scale (participants were told that 50
and above was a positive evaluation and 70 represented “outstanding") and were
explained to be the most influential questions on the evaluation. The endpoints on the
100-point scale were not defined in order to avoid ceiling effects in participant
evaluations. The score of 70 was defined as “outstanding” to give participants more
freedom in what scores could be viewed as positive versus exceptionally positive, and to
avoid having participants view the 100-point scale as a standard grading range, such as
90-100 being an A. In this way, we could make participants believe that their evaluation
of the applicant was average in comparison to other evaluations and, as a result, harmful.
Second Questionnaire. Once the lab manager evaluation was completed, the
applicant filled out a second questionnaire (See Appendix D). This questionnaire was
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explained to have no influence on the applicant's chances of being hired—it was simply
being used to further investigate the participant’s views of the applicant. The
questionnaire examined how much the participant liked the applicant, felt threatened by
the applicant, and felt envious of the applicant. The questionnaire also gauged the
participant's levels of guilt, responsibility and schadenfreude.
Halfway through the questionnaire, participants were informed that, in
comparison to other evaluations by past students, they had given the applicant a negative
evaluation. Those applicants who were hired last year (they were told) received an
average score of 96 out of 100 on these two questions. Participants who had given the
applicant a score lower than 96, therefore, could conclude that their score, in comparison,
was negative and could cause the applicant to lose the job. Following this, a
questionnaire again recorded participants' emotional states, such as feelings of happiness,
guilt, and responsibility.
Lab Assistant Evaluation. Finally, the participant filled out a second evaluation of
the applicant, this time for the position of lab assistant (See Appendix E). This
evaluation was almost identical to the first one, consisting of 46 questions that allowed
the participant to rate the applicant on a number of different qualities, and ended with two
questions about whether or not the applicant should be hired. These questions were
presented as being the most influential part of their evaluation. This evaluation would be
used (they were told) if the applicant did not have a high enough score to qualify for lab
manager. It was (in reality) compared to the first evaluation to see if the applicant had
changed her view of the applicant due to guilt at giving her a negative evaluation.
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Prosocial behavior was operationally defined as the difference between the second
evaluations' scores and the first evaluations' scores.
Operational Definitions. A measure of overall envy of the applicant was created
by combining participants' self-reported envy of the applicant both before and after
learning of their negative effect on the applicant (Cronbach's alpha= .69). Schadenfreude
was operationally defined as a combination of four measurements. These measurements
consisted of participants’ self-reported levels of feeling “happy,” “good,” “satisfied,” and
“sad” and were taken directly after participants learned of their negative effect on the
applicant (Cronbach’s alpha= .73).
Summary of Design. The primary between-subjects factors were responsibility
and narcissism 2 and the main dependent variables were reported levels of schadenfreude,
envy, and guilt, and the evaluation scores. We predicted that narcissists would
experience more schadenfreude, more envy, and less guilt than less narcissistic
individuals, regardless of their level of responsibility. Less narcissistic individuals, in
contrast, were expected to be highly influenced by the responsibility manipulation. As
opposed to narcissists, they should experience a moderate amount of schadenfreude and
less guilt when low in responsibility, but their schadenfreude would be replaced by guilt
when they were in the high responsibility condition.

2

The “narcissists” examined in this study are narcissistic according to the Narcissism Personality
Inventory. In other words, they had relatively high levels of narcissism compared with other participants
sampled. Clearly the narcissists we studied are found in a normal population and are not likely to have
symptoms as extreme as those shown by individuals with narcissistic personality disorder.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
A manipulation check verified that most participants remembered that hired
applicants from the year before had received an average score of 96, with 57 of the 66
participants (86%) remembering the exact score. Participants’ recall of their own
evaluation scores was also strongly correlated with the actual scores that they gave the
applicant, r(64)= .69, p <.001. Although only 27 of the 66 participants (41%)
remembered their score exactly, 50 of the 66 participants’ estimates of their own
evaluation scores were only five or fewer away from of their actual score (Mdiff= 4.07,
SD= 10.47).
Those participants in the high responsibility condition reported feeling slightly
more responsibility (M= 4.84, SD= 2.07) than participants in the low responsibility
condition (M= 4.17, SD= 2.74), but this difference was not statistically significant, t(64)=
1.11, ns. This suggests that either participants did not take note of how many other
participants were evaluating the applicant besides them, or that they did but another
factor determined the extent to which they felt personal responsibility.
An examination of the means for the NPI revealed an unequal distribution of
narcissists between the two responsibility conditions. Although participants were
randomly assigned to conditions, by chance somewhat higher levels of narcissism were
found in the high responsibility condition (M= 17.06, SD= 7.55), compared with the low
responsibility condition (M= 14.40, SD= 7.41), t(64)= 1.71, p= .09.
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Effects of Responsibility Manipulation
We hypothesized that participants’ level of responsibility for the applicant’s
reduced likelihood of being hired for the job would affect participants’ levels of
schadenfreude, their prosocial behavior, and their reported guilt. However, we found no
evidence to support this. A 2 (responsibility: high or low) x 2 (narcissism: high or low)
ANOVA 3 was conducted for each of the dependent variables. The responsibility
manipulation did not significantly affect any of the dependent variables, either by itself or
as part of an interaction. Covarying out self-esteem did not change these findings. As a
result, none of the following analyses described will involve the responsibility
manipulation.
Schadenfreude
One of the key goals of this study was to examine the extent to which narcissists
felt schadenfreude. A correlational analysis revealed a significant relationship between
narcissism and schadenfreude, with narcissists experiencing more schadenfreude than
those lower in narcissism, r(64)= .29, p= .02. This effect existed even when covarying
out self-esteem, confirming that it was narcissism, and not self-esteem, which was
responsible for this effect. This finding supports our hypothesis that narcissists
experience more schadenfreude at the setbacks of others than less narcissistic individuals.
Self-esteem alone was not significantly related to schadenfreude, r(64)= .15, p= .22.
We expected that those participants with less guilt and more envy of the applicant
would experience more schadenfreude. These predictions were generally supported.
Participants who felt more schadenfreude also felt more envy of the participant, r(64)=

3

ANOVAs used to examine interactions used a median split for narcissism. When interactions were not
examined, as with correlational analyses, no median split was used.
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.34, p= .01, and marginally less guilt after learning of their negative effect on the
applicant, r(64)= -.21, p= .09.
Evaluation Scores
We predicted that narcissists would evaluate applicants more negatively than less
narcissistic individuals, but found no support for this prediction. Narcissists were
actually slightly more likely to recommend hiring the applicant, r(64)= .22, p= .07.
Although not significant, this relationship was in the opposite direction than was
expected. Narcissists were slightly more likely to evaluate the applicant more positively
for the lab manager position, r(64)= .21, p= .10. This relationship was even stronger
when isolating two components of the NPI. Applicant evaluations were positively
correlated with the subscales of superiority, r(64)= .33, p= .01, and vanity, r(64)= .37, p=
.002.
A similar trend was found for the second evaluation of the applicant (for the
position of lab assistant). Although narcissism in general was not significantly related to
a more positive evaluation on the second evaluation, r(64)= .15, p= .24, the same subcomponents of the NPI were significantly related to giving a more positive evaluation.
Specifically, evaluations for the second evaluation (for the lab assistant position) were
positively related to the subscales of superiority, r(64)= .32, p= .01, and vanity, r(64)=
.33, p= .01. As before, these findings were not in the expected direction. The
relationships between the subscales of superiority and vanity and both evaluations existed
even when covarying for self-esteem.
Narcissism was expected to be negatively related to prosocial behavior. In other
words, narcissists were expected to exhibit smaller increases in their evaluation scores
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from the first evaluation to the second compared with participants lower in narcissism. A
2 (narcissism: high or low) x 2 (evaluation scores: pre and post) mixed-design ANOVA
found no statistically reliable relationship between narcissism and prosocial behavior,
F(1,64)= 2.03, p= .16. This relationship was not changed when covarying for guilt,
although a moderate relationship was found between prosocial behavior and guilt, r(64)=
.24, p= .06. Overall, participants rated the applicant more positively on the second
evaluation for lab assistant, (M= 83.37, SD= 15.52), than on the first evaluation for lab
manager (M= 73.72, SD= 12.76), F(1,64)= 53.07, p < .001. This indicates that either
participants, narcissists and nonnarcissists alike, exhibited prosocial behavior after
learning of their negative impact on the applicant, or they rated the applicant more
positively due to the differences between the position of lab manager and lab assistant.
Interestingly, despite their more positive evaluations of the applicant, narcissists
were more likely than nonnarcissists to indicate belief in their superiority over the
applicant, r(64)= .35, p= .004. This finding is consistent with past research indicating
that narcissists are arrogant.
Guilt and Envy
Past research has found that narcissists are less prone to guilt. Narcissism was
negatively, though not significantly, correlated with guilt levels before participants found
out about their negative effect on the applicant, r(64)= -.21, p= .09. Covarying for selfesteem eliminated this effect, r(63)= .004, ns. Narcissism was also negatively correlated
with guilt levels after participants learned of their negative effect on the applicant,
although this relationship was less powerful, r(64)= -.13, p= .30. Covarying for selfesteem again made this relationship less powerful and even changed the direction of the
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effect, r(63)= .08, ns. A 2 (narcissism: high or low) x 2 (guilt: pre and post) mixeddesign ANOVA revealed a significant increase in guilt levels for all participants from
before (M= 3.11, SD= 2.10) to after (M= 4.55, SD= 2.35) learning of their negative effect
on the applicant, F(1,64)= 24.88, p <.001. The magnitude of change for guilt was no
different for high or low narcissists, F(1, 64)= 0.13, ns.
Self-esteem, however, was negatively correlated with levels of guilt both before,
r(64)= -.41, p= .001, and after, r(64)= -.37, p= .003, participants learned of their negative
effect on the applicant. These effects were fundamentally unchanged when narcissism
was covaried. A 2 (self-esteem: high or low) x 2 (guilt: pre and post) mixed-design
ANOVA revealed that, overall, participants showed more guilt after learning of their
negative effect on the applicant than before, F(1,64)= 25.13, p <.001. The magnitude of
guilt change, however, was unrelated to self-esteem, F(1,64)= 0.31, ns. Covarying for
narcissism also did not significantly change the relationship between narcissism and guilt
either before or after participants learned of their negative effect. This suggests a
stronger relationship between self-esteem and guilt than narcissism and guilt.
Narcissism was related to dispositional envy, r(64)= -.31, p= .01, with narcissists
reporting fewer experiences of envy in their everyday lives. Narcissism was not,
however, correlated with envy of the applicant, r(64)= -.02, ns. Overall, envy of the
applicant was positively related to higher levels of guilt both before participants learned
of their negative impact on the applicant, r(64)= .57, p <.001, and afterwards, r(64)= .30,
p= .01. This finding suggests that being more envious of the applicant is related to a
higher level of guilt in general, even before one is informed of their negative effect on
another person. See Table 1 for a summary of relevant results.
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Table 1
Summary of Results

___

Dependent Variables

Low Narcissism

High Narcissism

Correlation

Schadenfreude

M= 3.82
SD= 1.39

M= 4.67
SD= 1.70

r(64)= .29,
p= .02

Guilt

M= 4.60
SD= 2.63

M= 4.48
SD= 2.03

r(64)= -.13,
p= .30

Envy of Applicant

M= 4.10
SD= 1.97

M= 4.15
SD= 1.77

r(64)= -.02,
p= .90

Dispositional Envy

M= 29.57
SD= 11.90

M= 23.16
SD= 9.98

r(64)= -.31,
p= .01

Evaluation Scores

M= 71.89
SD= 13.00

M= 75.79
SD= 12.36

r(64)= .21,
p= .10

Prosocial Behavior

M= 9.01
SD= 11.70

M= 10.37
SD= 9.65

r(64)= -.04,
p= .78

Belief in Superiority

M= 2.77
SD= 1.54

M= 3.52
SD= 1.98

r(64)= .35,
p= .004

Note. A median split of narcissism was used for the means and standard deviations. The correlations did
not use a median split for narcissism.
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Additional analyses revealed that envy was related to reported suspicion of the
study. The debriefing of participants revealed that some participants reported suspicion
of the study’s authenticity. A variable was created based on debriefing responses and
comments that ranked participants on their level of suspicion (No Suspicion [n= 28], Low
Suspicion [n= 28], High Suspicion [n= 15]. Note that the High Suspicion category
excludes the five participants described earlier who correctly guessed the purpose of the
study and thus were excluded from all analyses. For example, if the participant
hypothesized that a key element of the study was whether or not he or she would feel
happy about seeing such an impressive applicant fail and change their evaluations as a
result, we eliminated that participant from all analyses. If the participant was suspicious
that the applicant had been created but was not certain, we did not eliminate her, but
instead placed her in the High Suspicion category. Suspicion was positively correlated
with initial envy of the applicant, r(64)= .34, p= .01, and did not depend on narcissism or
self-esteem. This suggests that envy of the applicant motivated participants’ disbelief in
such an outstanding applicant’s existence, perhaps to protect themselves from ego threat.
Discussion
One of the main hypotheses of this study was that narcissists would experience
more schadenfreude than less narcissistic individuals. The results of this study support
this hypothesis. Narcissists reported significantly more schadenfreude than less
narcissistic individuals after learning that they had negatively affected the applicant. This
effect was not related to self-esteem, which suggests that it is narcissism, and not selfesteem, which drives this relationship.
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There were no main effects or interactions involving the manipulation of the
responsibility the participant had for the applicant not getting the job. This may indicate
that being very influential in the downfall of the envied other makes no difference in
one’s levels of schadenfreude or guilt, or this may just be an indication of a weak
manipulation. The manipulation check was not successful in demonstrating participants’
differing sense of responsibility. The responsibility manipulation was designed in this
way because a pilot study suggested that the responsibility manipulation was too strong.
The original manipulation told participants that their evaluation alone had caused the
applicant to lose the job or that another participant’s evaluation had caused the applicant
to lose the job. In the pilot study, participants appeared to disbelieve their strong role in
the hiring process, and the manipulation was changed as a result. It is possible, however,
that this change made the manipulation too weak, causing some participants to be
unaware of the negative effect that they had on the applicant.
One of the most surprising results was that narcissists actually evaluated the
applicants more positively than less narcissistic participants on both evaluations. This
was contrary to what was expected, as past research has indicated aggression of
narcissists towards superior others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). One possible explanation
for this relates to the personality of the applicant. The applicant was made slightly
arrogant in order to avoid ceiling effects in participant evaluations. It is possible that one
unforeseen side effect of the applicant’s arrogance was to endear the applicant to
narcissists more than to participants lower in narcissism. Narcissists are typically
arrogant themselves and may, therefore, not have been as repulsed by the applicant’s
arrogant tendencies. Due to their arrogance, they may have viewed the arrogance of the

21

applicant as a sign of a confident and qualified leader. Past research has demonstrated
that individuals are more attracted to others who are similar to them (Kupersmidt,
DeRosier, & Patterson, 1995; Newcomb, 1961).
Narcissists, however, were significantly more likely than nonnarcissists to rate
themselves as superior to the applicant and more qualified for the position of lab
manager. This supports the assumption of narcissists’ arrogance. It could even be
concluded that narcissists did not experience an ego threat from the applicant or they
would have derogated the applicant. It is possible that narcissists were able to recognize
the excellence of the applicant, but were not threatened by her due to their strong belief
that they were, nevertheless, superior to the applicant.
Narcissists reported significantly lower levels of dispositional envy, but not
significantly less envy of the applicant. This may indicate a sensitivity in the extensively
validated 8-item measure of dispositional envy that was not matched by the 3-item
measure of envy of the applicant created for this study. The fact that narcissists rated the
applicant more positively than nonnarcissists suggests that they were not envious of the
applicant.
Narcissism was expected to relate to a number of different variables with which it
had no relationship. For example, narcissism was not significantly related to prosocial
behavior. In fact, all participants significantly increased their scores of the applicant
during the second evaluation, regardless of their narcissistic tendencies or the level of
their responsibility. It is possible that all participants rated applicants more highly the
second time due to the less demanding qualifications needed for the position of lab
assistant. A relationship was found, however, between prosocial behavior and guilt. This
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suggests that it was the relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior that led to a
higher evaluation the second time, rather than the different demands of the job.
Schadenfreude was correlated with less guilt and more envy of the applicant.
This suggests that, in order for participants to be free to experience schadenfreude, they
may require lower levels of guilt, as more guilt would take away their ability to enjoy the
applicant’s setback. Envy was linked to lower levels of guilt. This suggests that when
participants were envious enough of the applicant they may have ignored any tendencies
they had to feel guilt due to the extent of their envy.
Self-esteem was also shown to be an indicator of guilt levels. Those participants
with high self-esteem were found to experience less guilt than those with lower selfesteem. As mentioned before, this effect was not found for narcissism and guilt. This
suggests that an individuals’ degree of self-esteem, as opposed to narcissism, is related to
their experience of guilt.
Unexpectedly, a correlation was found between suspicion of the study during the
debriefing and envy of the applicant. Those participants who reported more suspicion
over the hypothesis of the experiment or the genuineness of the applicant were found to
also be more envious of the applicant. It is possible that envy of the applicant, and a wish
to believe that such an applicant does not really exist, motivated participants’ suspicion of
the authenticity of the applicant and the study in general.
Limitations
A number of limitations in this study may account for some of the unexpected
results. First, the responsibility manipulation may not have been sufficiently strong. As
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discussed earlier, the strength of the study’s manipulation was decreased in order to
increase its believability. This may have made the manipulation too weak, however.
Second, narcissism levels were not equally distributed amongst the different
conditions of the study. Specifically, although participants were randomly assigned to
conditions, more high narcissists were in the high responsibility condition, and more low
narcissists were in the low responsibility condition. This occurrence may have affected
the results of the study.
Third, it cannot be guaranteed that participants were, in fact, threatened by the
applicant. Although debriefing results suggest that most participants were impressed by
the applicant’s qualifications and impressive resume, it is possible that participants lacked
sufficient feelings of envy and inferiority. This is a difficult phenomenon to test,
however, since people are not often willing to report when they experience an ego threat.
Fourth, the evident arrogance of the applicant may have influenced results with
regard to participants’ scores of the applicants. Not only might narcissists not be as
repelled by this trait, but this is an adequate reason to suggest that an applicant not be
hired. In other words, it is possible that logical concerns about arrogance, as opposed to
envy, would lead participants to give negative evaluations. For these reasons, another
manipulation aimed at managing ceiling effects might be more effective.
Finally, due to the design of the study, only females were allowed to participate.
This eliminates the possibility of generalizing these results to males as well as females.
Future studies would benefit from a study design that includes both males and females.
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Future research is needed to verify and further investigate the relationships
between the variables of interest. Nevertheless, this study has provided new information
with regard to narcissism and schadenfreude. Although the role of responsibility did not
affect schadenfreude, guilt, or prosocial behavior in this study, responsibility may still
play a role in this relationship. Future study is needed to fully uncover those
relationships. For now, this study has provided a better understanding of how individuals
react towards threatening others, and how they respond to having caused harm.
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